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Piercing of the Corporate Veil in Korea:
Case Commentary
Eun Young Shin* and In Yeung J. Cho**
Abstract
The purpose of this Commentary is to critically appraise the jurisprudence of Korea on the
doctrine of corporate veil piercing with a special emphasis on the Korean Supreme Court’s
decision in 2004Da26119. In 2004Da26119, the Supreme Court of Korea delineated the criteria
for disregarding the corporate entity under Korean corporate law, particularly in the parent-
subsidiary context. As part of its purported aim, the Commentary will analyze the constitutive
elements of veil piercing as understood by Korean courts and attempt to survey the evolution of
jurisprudence on veil piercing leading up to 2004Da26119. The Commentary will argue that a
showing of parental motive and/or purpose, which the Supreme Court required in 2004Da26119
as part of prima facie proof for veil piercing, may well dampen the overall efficacy of veil piercing
in Korea, due to the evidentiary hardship it will pose in practice.
I. Introduction
Today’s corporations set up subsidiaries for a variety of reasons including
optimal corporate governance and diversification of business. In the context of
a parent-subsidiary relationship, there may be situations where, from a legal
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standpoint, each constituent company exists as a separate entity, whereas,
from an economic viewpoint, the subsidiary in effect operates under uniform
control of the parent. In situations involving such a corporate group, treating
the parent company and its subsidiary as distinct legal entities may result in
an outcome that, depending on the facts involved, defies the principle of
justice and equity. The utility of piercing the corporate veil1) has been debated
in Korea in an ongoing bid to redress such possible inequity. Arguably, while
the concept of veil piercing2) is not confined to the realm of parent company-
subsidiaries, cases involving a single economic unit would, in general, be
more prone to veil piercing than others. In fact, the doctrine of veil piercing is
likely to foment more issues and controversies in the parent-subsidiary
context than any other.
In the case at hand,3) the plaintiff put forward the allegation that the
defendant’s denial of liability behind the façade of a subsidiary controlled by
him, amounted to an abuse of corporate personality in contravention to the
principle of good faith,4) but the Supreme Court of Korea held that the facts of
the case did not warrant the corporate veil to be lifted. In so holding, the Court
spelled out the criteria for disregarding the corporate entity under Korean
corporate law. 
In what follows, we will first examine the existing case laws in Korea on
veil piercing followed by an appraisal of 2004Da26119 from the perspective of
bringing veil piercing into play in the parent company-subsidiary context. 
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1) See Black’s Law Dictionary 1168 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “piercing the corporate veil: the
judicial act of imposing liability on otherwise immune corporate officers, directors, and
shareholders for the corporation’s wrongful acts. Also termed disregarding the corporate
entity.”). 
2) In Korea, the term “Beop-in-kyuk-bu-in” (disregarding the corporate entity) is used to
describe this judicial action. 
3) Judgment of Aug. 25, 2006, 2004Da26119 (Supreme Court of Korea) [hereinafter
2004Da26119].
4) In 2004Da26119, the plaintiff also alleged the presence of a guaranty and of an intent to
create an agency at the end of the defendant, ratification of acts of an agent with no authority,
issuance of work direction in violation of Article 401(2) of the SANGBEOP [KOREAN COMMERCIAL
CODE], and establishment of joint torts as the grounds of appeal, and the Supreme Court ruled
thereon. Such rulings, however, are beyond the scope of this Commentary. 
II. Existing Case Laws in Korea on Corporate Veil Piercing5)
1. Judgment of Sept. 13, 1977, 74Da954 (Supreme Court of Korea) 
1) Facts of 74Da954
The facts of this case are as follows. Origin Co., Ltd. (“Origin”) was a
limited liability company incorporated by defendant Bong-Gil Kim,6) his wife,
brother-in-law, other close relatives, and law clerk on July 10, 1967. The
business name of Origin later changed to Taewon Co., Ltd. (“Taewon”) as of
November 12, 1968. From its inception as Origin, Taewon was incorporated as
a shelf company through arbitrary use by the defendant of the names of his
wife, next of kin, and law clerk. The defendant appointed himself as the
Representative Director of Taewon with virtually all of the working capital
personally financed by him. As a consequence, the defendant could readily
position himself as the controlling shareholder, and the allotment of shares to
the name-only equity holders including his wife, next of kin and law clerk was
made at the whim of the defendant in the form of gift or contributory stocks.
Also, the capital of KRW7) 5 million at the time of incorporation (later
increased to KRW 10 million) was relatively small for the volume of overseas
exports Taewon was engaging in (amounting to $10,000). Further, the basic
assets of Taewon consisted of only a few parcels of industrial land at Hwa-yong
Dong, Sung-dong District in Seoul. On account of its unsound financial
conditions, Taewon evidently relied on outside credit facilities for management
purposes including those from the plaintiff. 
In addition, the business office of Taewon was located inside the defendant’s
law office, and the company was effectively run as the defendant’s privately
owned business with the requisite legal formalities either kept to a bare
minimum or ignored outright. Further, the assets of Taewon and the defendant’s
personal assets were improperly mixed. As such, when there was a pressing
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5) It is noted that there is no express statutory basis in Korea for corporate veil piercing.
Pertinent case laws seem to have based veil piercing on the principle of good faith as codified in
the MINBEOP [CIVIL CODE] (Korean); see infra note 9. 
6) Bong-Gil Kim was an attorney-at-law by profession. 
7) Refers to Korean Won, the official currency of the Republic of Korea. 
need to settle the accounts of Taewon, the defendant’s personal assets were
used towards that end, and as the liabilities of Taewon mounted resulting in
increased risk of attachment against certain assets of the company, the
defendant effected the provisional registration of such assets under his name
and subsequently disposed of the same, thereby siphoning off corporate assets
and leaving creditors with little or no recourse. 
As the company drifted further into doldrums, the defendant ran Taewon
like a sole proprietorship by turning a blind eye to corporate formalities
including those on shareholders meetings, board of directors’ resolutions, and
invocation of right to auditing. In effect, Taewon was nothing but a sham
sugarcoated with the appearance of a limited liability corporation. 
In the meanwhile, Taewon issued several promissory notes to the plaintiff
from June 3, 1969 to August 26, 1969 for a total of KRW 8,240,000. When these
promissory notes were not honored as they became due, the plaintiff
instituted an in personam proceeding against the defendant to enforce its
creditor rights. 
2) Judicial holdings of 74Da954 and comments
At the appellate level, the Seoul High Court affirmed abuse by the
defendant of the corporate personality of Taewon from the facts that: i) the
defendant used Taewon as a façade; ii) the company was in effect operated as
the defendant’s personal enterprise; iii) Taewon was undercapitalized; iv) the
defendant ignored corporate formalities and protocols; and v) the defendant
siphoned off corporate assets for the purpose of preempting creditor claims
and enforcement actions against Taewon.8) The court held that the foregoing
acts of abuse would not only render the very purpose of corporate entity, a
legal fiction concocted to acclimate societal and economic impacts of the
corporation, meaningless, but also dispel substantive justice and the principle
of good faith.9) As such, the high court ruled in favor of the plaintiff regarding
his creditor claims involving the liabilities of Taewon.10)
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8) Judgment of May 8, 1974, 72Na2582 (Seoul High Ct.).
9) Id. The principle of good faith is codified in Article 2(1) of the CIVIL CODE, which
provides: “The exercise of rights and the performance of duties shall be in accordance with the
principle of trust and good faith.”
10) Id.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court overturned the high court judgment
with a brief ratio that the company was not a mere façade and did not further
articulate on the contours of veil piercing that had been adopted in the
affirmative at the appellate level.11)
In respect of the Supreme Court ruling, legal commentators critiqued the
Court as having erred in refusing to lift the corporate veil for the reason that
Taewon was a legitimate one man company, for such refusal stemmed from a
mischaracterization of veil piercing.12)
2. Judgment of Nov. 22, 1988, 87Daka1671 (Supreme Court of Korea) 
1) Facts of 87Daka1671
The facts of this decision are as follows. Defendants Hyundai Mipo
Dockyard (“HMD”) and Samsung Aerial Services provisionally attached a
commercial vessel (the “Subject Vessel”) to preserve the enforcement of their
individual monetary claims against Chipstead Co., Ltd (“Chipstead”). Plaintiff
Grand Harmony Inc., the owner of the Subject Vessel, commenced a third
party action challenging the validity of the provisional attachment. Chipstead
was not privy to the suit.
The plaintiff was a Liberian company with its main offices at 80 Monrovia
Broad Street.13) On April 1, 1981, the plaintiff and Touchest Shipping Ltd., a
Liberian company with the same main office as plaintiff (“Touchest”), entered
into a maintenance contract in respect of the Subject Vessel.14) The signatories
to this contract were Daniel Puchieh Lee on behalf of the plaintiff and Denis
Puping Lee on behalf of Touchest, respectively.15) On the same day, Touchest
signed off a sub-agency contract with Chipstead whose main office was at
Kennedy Road, Hong Kong, for maintenance of the Subject Vessel. The
signatories to this sub-agency contract were Denis Puping Lee on behalf of
Touchest and Daniel Puchieh Lee on behalf of Chipstead, respectively.16)
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11) 74Da954.
12) Jae-Hyeong Chang, Panryeeh natanan beopinkyeokbuin [The Doctrine of Corporate Veil
Piercing in Case Law], 15-1 SEOUL BAR ASSOCIATION CASE LAW STUDY 147, 154 (2001).




The de facto address of Touchest was identical to that of Chipstead, and
they shared phone and facsimile numbers.17) The chairman of Touchest was
Dennis Puping Lee, who served as the president of the plaintiff company, and
Touchest’s president was Daniel Puchieh Lee, who was also the executive
director of the plaintiff.18) The directors of Chipstead consisted of Daniel
Puchieh Lee and Denis Puping Lee, who were siblings.19) Upon a direction to
get the Subject Vessel fixed at HMD, the vessel was arranged to enter the port
of Ulsan on April 1, 1985; at the time of the entry, Chipstead Hong Kong was
recorded in as the owner of the vessel.20) Later, when Suk-Lock Lee, who
served as Head of the Tokyo Branch of Chipstead, signed off a service contract
with HMD on June 10, 1985 in consideration of repair services to be dispensed
by HMD, Mr. Lee put Chipstead on the contract as the vessel owner.21) As
such, HMD undertook repairs with the knowledge that the Subject Vessel
legitimately belonged to Chipstead.22)
The Court also noted that it is customary in the international shipping
industry for a ship owner to set up a shelf company in such places as Panama
or Liberia, as opposed to the country of the owner’s nationality or of the
corporate origin, register the ship under the name of such shelf company,
hoist the flag of the country of registry, and so sail.23) Following or concurrently
with the registration process, the actual owner enters into a maintenance
contract with the shelf company and purports to merely act as a managing
corporation.24) This practice enables ship owners to perform jurisdiction
shopping and benefit from variances in finance, labor and regulatory regime
between the owner’s country of origin and the country of registry, for ease
and maximal efficacy in management.25) In light of this trade practice, it is
customary for dockyards and related businesses to sign off contractual
arrangements with the managing corporation who is the actual owner of the
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25) Id. at 65-66. 
ship, as opposed to the registered owner, and get remunerated as such.26)
2) Judicial rulings of 87Daka1671 
Affirming the appellate court ruling, the Supreme Court noted that even
though Touchest and Chipstead were disparate entities outwardly, Chipstead
had in fact incorporated the plaintiff and Touchest, both of which shared the
same corporate office and management, for managerial convenience.27) In
view of this finding, the Court denied the plaintiff its plea alleging the distinct
legal entity of Touchest and Chipstead, as such claim was aimed at avoidance
of obligations and hence counter to the principle of good faith.28)
The majority of Korean jurists touted this judgment as squarely affirming
the principle of veil piercing.29) The decision, however, was subject to criticism
as it merely adumbrated the principle without defining its four corners.30) That
is, some scholars suggested that the Court in 87Daka1671 had failed to
ascertain a sufficient factual basis for finding an abuse of the corporate entity,
other than the sharing of the same office and management as between
Touchest and Chipstead.31) Other jurists suggest that 87Daka1671 was not a
case about veil piercing per se, but an attempt at analogizing veil piercing
with violation of the principle of good faith and trust.32) Accordingly, there is a
lingering doubt as to whether 87Daka1671 embodies a landmark decision
Piercing of the Corporate Veil in Korea   |  33No. 1: 2009
26) Id. at 66. 
27) Id.
28) Id.
29) Although the facts of 87Daka1671 do not fit the mould of the typical veil piercing case, in
which liability is usually sought against the company’s shareholders or officers, the Court
appears to have affirmed veil piercing in this case following the enterprise liability doctrine
developed in the U.S. Under this doctrine, U.S. courts sometimes disregard “multiple
incorporations of the same business under common ownership,” especially where a business is
divided into several affiliate or sister entities owned by the same investor(s). See Alan R.
Palmiter Corporations 556 (5th ed. 2006). For the representative case under the doctrine, see
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E. 2d 6 (N.Y. 1966). Since, as surveyed above, 87Daka1671 involved
multiple incorporations (i.e. Touchest and Chipstead) under common ownership, it might have
proved an apt occasion for the Court to adopt the enterprise liability doctrine in the affirmative.
30) See, e.g., Chan-Hyung Jung, Beopinkyeok buinron [Doctrine of Corporate Veil Piercing], 226
CASE LAW MONTHLY 29, 35-36 (Jul. 1989).
31) See, Dong-yun Chung, Beopinkyeok buinroneh kwanhan daebeopwonpanryeui chueui [Trend
of Supreme Court Cases on Veil Piercing] 20 LAWYER (Jan. 1990). 
32) Jung, supra note 30, at 35-6. 
affirming veil piercing for the first time at the Court level. 87Daka1671 is
nevertheless meaningful in that it served as the judicial vehicle for igniting
scholarly debates in Korea on the contours of veil piercing. 
3. Judgment of Jan. 19, 2001, 97Da21604 (Supreme Court of Korea)
1) Facts of 97Da21604
The facts of this decision are as follows. Defendant Samjin Co., Ltd.
(“Samjin”) whose Representative Director was Jung-Su Lee who was also a co-
defendant in the case, was in the business of selling units of a commercial
high-rise (a seventeen-story building with a five-story basement) to be
constructed by Kunyoung Co., Ltd. (“Kunyoung”). On June 19, 1991, the
plaintiff entered into a sale and purchase contract with Samjin for the purchase
of a unit (Unit No. 502) of the high-rise.33) Thereafter, the plaintiff made a
down payment and two interim payments up until March 30, 1992.34) Samjin’s
original plan was to finance the high-rise project with the sale proceeds. Yet as
Samjin’s sale of the high-rise went sour, payments to Kunyoung were delayed,
and Kunyoung eventually halted construction as of August, 1992.35)
In the meanwhile, defendant Jung-Su Lee was carrying on the business of
selling commercial premises and offices in his own name or under the names
of entities over which he exerted de facto control.36) As part of this business,
Mr. Lee purchased the shares of Samjin on May 3, 1991 from the company’s
then Representative Director Il-Hyoung Choi and became thereby Samjin’s new
Representative Director.37)
The number of Samjin’s issued shares was five thousand which, for
recordkeeping purposes, was divided among four equity holders including
Jung-Su Lee (Jung-Su Lee owned two thousands of these shares with the rest
equally divvied up among the remaining shareholders who were all related to
Lee).38) In fact, however, the vast majority of Samjin’s issued shares were in the
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33) 97Da21604, at 485.
34) Id.
35) Id. at 486.
36) Id. at 487.
37) Id.
38) Id.
hands of Jung-Su Lee.39) In addition, Lee practically made all managerial
decisions of Samjin without observing corporate formalities.40) By the time
plaintiff took its suit against the defendants, the offices of Samjin had been
permanently shut down.41)
From the sale proceeds of the high-rise amounting to KRW 7.8 billion,
defendant Jung-Su Lee used approximately KRW 3 billion to purchase the land
for the high-rise in his name and arranged for the levying of provisional
registration thereon in the name of a third party and had the same terminated
subsequently in anticipation of creditor claims.42) For the remaining proceeds,
Jung-Su Lee put them to use for untraceable purposes.43) As evidenced by the
foregoing, the corporate assets of Samjin and the personal assets of Jung-Su Lee
were improperly intermingled. In addition, despite the large-scale of the high-
rise project, Samjin was heavily undercapitalized with its capital amounting to
a meager KRW 50 million. At the end of the day, Samjin was in effect
insolvent.44)
2) Rulings of 97Da21604/comments
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff would be entitled to demand the
sale proceeds back from either Samjin or Jung-Su Lee who wielded de facto
control over Samjin behind the corporate veil.45) Specifically in relation to the
issue of veil piercing, the Supreme Court enunciated in the following vein.
When a company maintains the public appearance of a corporation, but
such appearance is merely a sham and the company, in essence, is reduced
down to a private enterprise of the principal behind the corporate veil or to an
instrument for staving off legal effects at the helm of the principal, it would be
egregious to impute liability arising from what is ostensibly an act of the
company to the company alone, and not to the principal, based on the
former’s separate legal persona.46) Such imputation of liability, if accepted by
Piercing of the Corporate Veil in Korea   |  35No. 1: 2009







46) Id. at 487.
courts, would constitute an abuse of corporate personality in violation of the
principle of good faith and be singularly contrary to justice and equity. From
this analysis, it would be sensible to hold both the company and the principal
jointly liable for the corporate act at issue.47)
In the case at hand, in view of the relevant facts including the backdrop
against which the defendant had acquired the ownership of Samjin, the form
and extent of Jung-Su Lee’s control over Samjin, the degree of asset inter-
mingling between Jung-Su Lee and the company, the state of Samjin’s business
operation and usage of the sale proceeds, the size of Samjin’s commercial real
estate business, and overall status of corporate asset and solvency, it was
incontrovertible to the Court that, while Samjin took on the form of a limited
liability company, it, in essence, was no more than Jung-Su Lee’s sole pro-
prietorship.48) Therefore, even though Samjin became the party who sold the
high-rise in this case, it was nothing more than just an external appearance
and, in substance, the business of selling the high-rise was conducted by Jung-
Su Lee as his private business.49)
In this account, trial records indisputably indicated that Jung-Su Lee was
relying on the distinct legal entity of Samjin in denying liability in his personal
capacity. Such denial, in the Court’s view, would be at loggerheads with the
precepts of justice and equity.50)
In this case, the Supreme Court typified veil piercing into the following
two broad categories: i) abuse of corporate personality (i.e. where the
corporation is used by the principal as an arbitrary instrument for escaping
legal liability); and ii) formalization of corporate personality (i.e. even with the
formalities of a corporation, such form is but a cloak, and the corporation, in
effect, amounts to a private business of the principal lurking behind the
corporate veil).
The Court further delineated the criteria for the formalization of corporate
personality on a showing of de facto governance by shareholders of the
company, comingling of assets, lack of separate accounting apparatus,
intermingling of business status and corporate transactions, undercapitalization,
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47) Id.
48) Id. at 488. 
49) Id.
50) Id.
and failure to observe corporate protocols mandated by law.51) The decision
was lauded as the first case in Korea ushering the concept of veil piercing into
an actual case setting.52)
4. Judgment of Nov. 12, 2004, 2002Da66892 (Supreme Court of Korea) 
1) Facts of 2002Da66892
The facts of this case are as follows. The plaintiffs leased portions of a
building owned by Angunsa Co., Ltd. (“Angunsa”) in Sinsa-Dong, Eunpyung
District, Seoul and completed the registration of jeonse-kwon53) on their
respective leases. Angunsa went bankrupt shortly thereafter, and the above
building was auctioned off to a third party at the request of Korea Exchange
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51) Of recent, however, the Supreme Court denied lifting of the corporate veil in a case
involving a similar set of facts. In Judgment of Sep. 11, 2008, 2007Da90982 (Supreme Court of
Korea), the defendant held de facto control over Company I. Later on, the defendant wound up
Company I on the brink of its bankruptcy, while setting up Company 2 that took over both the
goodwill and personnel of Company I. The defendant also took control of Company 2. The
defendant subsequently dissolved Company 2 and incorporated in its place Company 6 in the
name of a third party. Against this backdrop, the Daegu High Court ruled that the defendant’s
denial of payment obligations vis-à-vis the plaintiff on account of the separate personhood of
Company 2 would embody an abuse of corporate personality in violation of the principle of
good faith, as well as justice and equity. The Supreme Court, however, overturned the High
Court by noting that: i) there had been no substantial mix of assets between Company 2 and the
defendant to the point of stripping Company 2 of its separate legal entity. Even when
considering all the factors probed by the High Court, the Court could not ascertain that
Company 2 had somehow amounted to a private business of the defendant in that the
defendant was simply borrowing the corporate form of Company 2 in carrying on legitimate
private business; and ii) under the principle of limited liability, there is nothing illicit about
winding up a corporation that is no longer a going concern, and subsequently setting up and
managing a new corporation via fresh injection of capital in so far as such sequential measures
are not aimed at harming creditors. In light of the extent to which the assets of Company 2 and
the defendant were commingled, which was far from substantial, the Court was unable to
identify any abuse by the defendant of the corporate personality of Company 2 and, as a result,
remanded the case back to the High Court. 
52) Han-sung Cha, Beopinkyeok buinron [Doctrine of Disregard of the Corporate Entity], STUDY OF
CIVIL CASE LAWS Vol. XXIV 568, 597 (Bak-young-sa 2002). 
53) In Korea, there is a unique way of renting a house called Jeonse, in which a tenant makes
a lump-sum deposit on a rental space, instead of paying monthly rents, and gets back the entire
deposit when the tenancy comes to an end. Jeonse-kwon ( ) refers to a tenant’s right to such
leasehold machination. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_estate_in_South_Korea (last
visited Aug. 31, 2009). 
Bank, a secured creditor with a higher ranking than the plaintiffs, and, in the
process, the plaintiffs’ respective jeonse-kwon were invalidated. As a result, the
plaintiffs could not secure their rental deposits back from Angunsa. In the
midst of this imbroglio, the plaintiffs commenced an action at the Western
District Office of the Seoul District Court against Angunsa for return of the
rental deposits, and Angunsa was ordered to pay them back to the plaintiffs.
In the meanwhile, following the bankruptcy of Angunsa, the defendant
company came into existence. Angunsa and the defendant were identical or
akin to each other in trade name, commercial emblems, objects of operation,
address of the main office, and composition of overseas affiliates.54) Also, the
two companies were similar when it came to the makeup of executives and
shareholders in that they mainly consisted of close relatives or employees of
Yong-Sik An who assumed the dual roles of the controlling shareholder-
Representative Director at Angunsa.55) In terms of the actual management, the
defendant held itself out to be synonymous with Angunsa since Yong-Sik An
assumed the Representative Directorship at the defendant company. As such,
Angunsa and the defendant were treated equal by outsiders, and the
defendant won certain projects on that basis.56)
2) Judicial rulings of 2002Da66892
On the issue of veiling piercing, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows in
ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. If an existing company has set up a new
company that is identical in substance and form to itself for the purpose of
eluding legal obligations, such act of incorporation amounts to an abuse of the
corporate law system in furtherance of illicit objectives.57) In such context,
therefore, allowing a claim asserting the separate legal entity of two putatively
distinct companies vis-à-vis the creditors of the existing company cannot be
accepted, since such claim vitiates the principle of good faith and trust.58)
Thus, a creditor of the existing company may demand the fulfillment of
financial obligations against either of the two companies.59)
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54) 2002Da66892, at 2015.
55) Id.
56) Id.
57) Id. at 2014. 
58) Id.
In the present case, the defendant company was identical or akin to
Angunsa in trade name, commercial emblem, objects of operation, location of
the main office, and constitution of overseas affiliates. The vast majority of
directors and shareholders of the defendant were either Yong-Sik An’s close
relatives or his former employees at Angunsa where Yong-Sik An had held the
Representative Directorship in his capacity as the controlling shareholder. The
defendant held out itself as equal with Angunsa in carrying out marketing and
sales activities. In the eyes of outsiders, therefore, the defendant was viewed
as the alter ego of Angunsa, and defendant captured projects as such. In
addition, Yong-Sik An continued to carry out his roles and responsibilities as
the Chairman of the defendant.60) Moreover, faced with a judicial order
forcing the defendant to assume the obligations of Angunsa, Yong-Sik An’s son
and others set up a company named Mutech Korea and won projects related
to the defendant.61) Further, on October 20, 1999, Angunsa transferred its
interior construction business to the defendant.62) In light of these evidentiary
elements, the Court found it sufficient to hold that Angunsa had incorporated
the defendant, which was substantially identical to Angunsa in corporate form
and substance, for the purpose of jettisoning its own financial obligations.63)
As such, the Court could not allow the defendant to hide behind Angunsa’s
separate personhood. Holding otherwise, the Court opined, would not
comport with the principle of good faith.64), 65)
In this judgment, the Supreme Court imputed liability to the defendant
company, which was set up in a way effectively identical to Angunsa in
corporate form and substance for the purpose of avoiding away the pecuniary
liabilities of Angunsa. It is submitted that this case is factually distinguishable
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65) It appears that the Supreme Court affirmed the principle of corporate veil piercing in
this case based on the unity of ownership and financial stakes, and presence of illicit purposes as
exemplified by evasion of pecuniary obligations. In addition, albeit not explicitly stated, the
Court here appears to have applied the enterprise liability doctrine in that, not unlike
87Daka1671, the facts of 2002Da66892 also involved multiple incorporations (namely, Angunsa
and defendant company) under common ownership. See supra note 29.
from other cases in that there was no direct shareholding relationship between
the defendant and Angunsa, both of which were controlled by a single
shareholder. 
Typically, the principle of veil piercing comes handy where a creditor
seeks to hold shareholders of a company personally accountable for the
company’s obligations. Yet, with time, abuse of the corporate entity has taken
on a variety of forms, one of which is sequential incorporations of the same
business under common ownership. As a matter of principle, there is nothing
illicit about winding up a corporation that is no longer a going concern, and
subsequently setting up and managing a new corporation via fresh injection
of capital in so far as such successive measures are not aimed at harming
creditors. In a context involving sequential incorporations, a question never-
theless arises as to whether the successor company may assert the separate
legal entity of both its own and of its predecessor against the creditors of the
predecessor corporation. It hence becomes increasingly important for courts to
set out under what circumstances and specific criteria the successor’s assertion
can make a viable claim.
Beginning with 2002Da66892, in cases involving sequential incorporations
by a common owner, the Court has probed whether the principal possessed
an intent to evade legal obligations in deciding whether to pierce the veil or
not. Specifically in 2002Da66892, the Court listed an identity of corporate form
and substance between the predecessor and successor as the key element for
proving the principal’s intent.66) The Court in 2006Da2443867) further refined
2002Da66892 by requiring an appraisal of the totality of pertinent circumstances
including the overall state of managerial affairs at the time of the predecessor’s
dissolution and the payment of arms length dues regarding transfer of assets,
if any, from the predecessor to the successor. 
In this respect, certain jurists may balk at extending the veil piercing to
sequential incorporations since such extension may result in dilution of
limited liability. Despite such concern, judicial expansion of the outer
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66) For a criticism that the Court’s ratio here is unclear and vague, see Young-ae Kwon,
Chaemumyeontalmokjeokeuro sullipdwen daechaehwesaeui beopinkyeok buin [Veil Piercing of Alternate
Companies Established for Liability Evasion], 8 COM. CASE L. REV. 1, 14 (Mar. 2005).
67) Judgment of Aug. 21, 2008, 2006Da24438 (Supreme Court of Korea).
boundaries of veil piercing is welcome and seems warranted in that rapid
changes in commercial practice will inevitably diversify ways in which abuse
of corporate entity are carried through. As such, courts will need to reckon
with this commercial reality by proactively adopting veil piercing, where
appropriate, on a case specific basis, in accord with the principles of justice
and equity.   
III. Analysis of 2004Da26119
1. Basic Facts 
Korea Telecom Philippines Inc. (“KTPI”), a wholly owned subsidiary of
defendant in the Philippines, entered into two separate Contracts for Project
Management, Supply and Installation of Outside Plant Facilities (collectively
“OSP Agreement”) with Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(“PT&T”) on October 11, 1995 and November 12, 1996, respectively, for
communication network extension projects near Manila (collectively the
“Project”).68) In connection with the Project, KTPI acted as the project manager
and subcontracted portions related to the supply of materials, provision of
services, and installation of communication lines to certain Korean companies
including the plaintiff.69) The plaintiff signed off two agreements with KTPI,
one on October 13, 1995 and the other on November 12, 1996 pertaining to
communication line installation and supply of raw materials, respectively
(“Subject Contracts”).70)
Pursuant to the OSP Agreement and Subject Contracts, PT&T was to pay
twenty percent of the total contract price directly to plaintiff.71) As for the
remaining portions, PT&T was obliged to pay KTPI by installed re-payment
over seven years with a three year grace period, and KTPI, in turn, was
obliged to pay the plaintiff via installed repayment over two years with a
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grace period of three years.72)
The size of KTPI’s capital was approximately KRW 1.6 billion, whereas the
total volume of the OSP Agreement amounted to $87 million (later increased
to $95 million through contractual amendments).73) For financing purposes,
KTPI signed off a credit agreement with The Chase Manhattan Bank (“CMB”)
on July 24, 1996 with a credit ceiling capped at $40 million (“Credit Agree-
ment”).74)
Prior to the Credit Agreement, defendant entered into a guarantee
agreement with CMB in relation to the financing to be provided under the
Credit Agreement (the “Chase Loan”) following an affirmative resolution of
defendant’s management advisory committee. Under the Credit Agreement,
KTPI took out the Chase Loan on demand and paid the plaintiff contract
monies and interests thereon in accordance with the Subject Contracts.75)
In the meanwhile, in the wake of an Asian financial crisis in 1997, PT&T
declared a debt moratorium around June 30, 1998.76) In response, the defendant
directed KTPI to minimize withdrawal of what was left of the Chase Loan and
consult in advance with the defendant thereby blocking in effect further
drawing out by KTPI of the Chase Loan.77) KTPI, in turn, stopped payments to
the plaintiff under the Subject Contracts. The plaintiff also halted what
remained outstanding of their material supplies to PT&T.78)
On or about October 26, 2000, the plaintiff and KTPI confirmed the balance
of account payables under the Subject Contracts at $20,978,488.23. Subsequently,
on or about March 6, 2001, KTPI paid out to the plaintiff $1,956,998.44 in
partial fulfillment of said account payables.79) The plaintiff instituted a suit on
September 12, 2001 for the purpose of claiming the balance.80)
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2. Court Rulings 
1) Judgment of Apr. 30, 2004, 2003Na11891 (Seoul High Court)81)
In general, when a company takes on the appearance of a corporation but
such appearance is but a façade, and the company, in essence, amounts to no
more than a sole proprietorship of the equity holder behind the corporate veil
or to a tool for circumventing contractual obligations, exempting the principal
from the liability of what is ostensibly an act of the company, under the
pretext of the company’s distinct legal persona, would dispel not only the
principle of good faith, but justice and equity.82) In such a context, therefore,
both the company and the principal alike ought to be rendered answerable to
the corporate act in question (in this regard, refer to 97Da2160483)).84)
In particular, in order for the principle of veil piercing to apply in a parent
-subsidiary relationship, the following criteria must be found present: i) a
mere fact of the parent company holding sway over the subsidiary by virtue
of wholly owning the subsidiary with attendant power to appoint directors
and officers by exercise of shareholder rights, will not pass muster. It is
necessary that the subsidiary has lost independent volition or existence, with
the parent exerting complete control to the point of operating the subsidiary as
part of its own business clan; ii) there should be comingling of assets, business
operation, and/or external corporate transactions between the parent and the
subsidiary; iii) consolidation of accounts ought to be put in place between the
two entities in tandem with disregard by the subsidiary of corporate
formalities and protocols; iv) the size of the subsidiary’s capital must be
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81) At the high court level, the plaintiff specifically alleged that: i) KTPI lacked independent
payment and overall fiscal abilities; ii) the defendant exerted complete dominion over KTPI by
way of shareholders meetings and board of directors meetings, with authority to issue business
related directions, plan budgets, pay out salaries and implement human resources policies; iii)
the defendant’s direction caused KTPI to stop drawing out the Chase Loan; and iv) since KTPI
had been dissolved and hence rendered insolvent, absolving the defendant of contractual
liabilities under the Subject Contracts on account of KTPI being a separate legal entity, would be
at odds with the principle of good faith. 
82) 2003Na11891, at 3, Da, (1), (Ga). 
83) See supra II. 3.
84) supra note 82.
conspicuously small for the overall tenor and volume of business it carries on;
v) the corporate entity of the subsidiary must have been misused as an
instrument to evade liability at the end of the parent.85)
In addition, the high court added the caveat that, as an exception to limited
corporate liability, the remedy of veil piercing will be granted only when the
corporate personality in question is put to use for illicit objectives, or in
violation of public policy, or as an instrument for rationalizing what is
otherwise illegal, or to perpetrate fraud or aid and abet a crime, with the aim
of stalling or making good such wrongs in line with the principles of equity.86)
As such, courts will not lift the corporate veil when: i) the other party in a
transaction could distinguish the parent from the subsidiary and was clearly
aware of which entity it was dealing with; or ii) such other party was
cognizant of the subsidiary being undercapitalized and still proceeded with
the transaction without precautionary measures; or iii) there is no clear and
convincing proof of illegality in the underlying transaction.87)
In the case at hand, the Seoul High Court found that: i) there were clear
divides in organization, assets, accounting, and details of business flow
between the defendant, a domestic Korean corporation, and KTPI, an offshore
Philippines corporation; ii) the size of KTPI’s capital was approximately KRW
1.6 billion, which might have been a bit small in light of KTPI’s obligations
under the Subject Contracts. Yet given the fact that KTPI had taken the role of
an intermediary between PT&T and the plaintiff, rather than the ultimate
payer, to facilitate the flow of credit, the size of KTPI’s capital was not deemed
markedly diminutive; iii) based on its full ownership of KTPI, the defendant
held strong leverage over KTPI in a broad spectrum of areas including
convening of shareholders and board of directors meetings, and matters
pertaining to human resources, business-related decisions, and remuneration
policy. The directors of KTPI were all on secondment from the defendant, and
KPTI underwent thorough advance consultation with the defendant before
proceeding with each transaction. In the eyes of the court, such working
relationship between the defendant and KTPI was not atypical for an overseas
subsidiary, and taking on orders or directives from the sole shareholder, as in
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the case of KTPI, was in proper alignment with the quintessence of a limited
liability corporation. In the meanwhile, KTPI crafted on its own accord the
planning, contract execution and performance for each underlying
transaction. KTPI also requested the defendant to guaranty the drawing out of
project funds while endorsing a debt restructuring plan following the
autonomous resolution of KTPI’s own Board of Directors despite the
defendant’s objection. In light of the foregoing, the court was unable to
ascertain complete domination over KPTI by the defendant to the point of
divesting KPTI of independent volition or corporate existence; iv) further, as
noted previously, at the time of entering into the Subject Contracts, the
plaintiff was clearly aware that KTPI was privy to the Subject Contracts, not
the plaintiff itself; v) the defendant authorized KTPI to make independent
calls on withdrawal of the Chase Loan in consideration of KTPI’s own
pecuniary resources; vi) above all, the high court was unable to spot elements
of unfairness in the Subject Contracts to pierce the corporate veil for any abuse
of corporate entity. Nor could the court ascertain that the defendant had put
KTPI to use for illicit objectives, or against the public good or as an instrument
for justifying what is otherwise prohibited at law, and/or to perpetrate fraud
or aid and abet a crime.88) Accordingly, the high court dismissed with
prejudice the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s refusal to pay out contract
monies by virtue of the distinct legal entity of KTPI would bring the principle
of good faith into disrepute.89)
2) Supreme Court Decision (2004Da26119)
At the outset, the Supreme Court noted that it would be natural for certain
degrees of labor and financial interplay to be in place between a parent
company and its subsidiaries.90) As such, the facts that: i) certain officers or
employees of the subsidiary are dually employed by the parent; ii) the parent
holds sway over the subsidiary through entire ownership of the subsidiary
with appurtenant rights to appoint directors, executives or officers; and iii) in
spite of an upward spiral in the overall magnitude of the subsidiary’s
corporate operation, there was no proportional increase in the subsidiary’s
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89) Id. at 3, Da, (3). 
90) 2004Da26119, at 1606.
capital, will be, in and of themselves, insufficient to render the parent’s
assertion of the subsidiary’s own legal persona an abuse of corporate
personality vis-à-vis creditors of the subsidiary.91) To trigger threshold, the
Court will require a showing of the parent company’s complete domination
over the subsidiary to the point of stripping independent volition or existence
with the result that the subsidiary is made part of the parent’s corporate
clan.92) Specifically, there should be objective indicia of assets, businesses and
external transactional activities not being clearly distinguished between the
parent and the subsidiary but mixed with each other. Above all, the court
should be able to pinpoint the subjective motive or purpose with which the
parent company arbitrarily abused the subsidiary’s independent legal entity
for dodging legal or pecuniary obligations.93)
In this regard, the court below noted that: i) at the time of entering into the
Subject Contracts, the defendant was a public corporation, and KTPI, a
company incorporated under the law of the Philippines, was carrying on
telecommunications business in the Philippines subject to periodic external
audits; ii) as an overseas subsidiary of the defendant, KTPI was capable of
mapping out independent management objectives and corresponding
budgets; and iii) in light of the universe of facts mused on by the high court
including KTPI’s assessment and performance of the Subject Contracts on its
own accord and request by KTPI of a guarantee from the defendant in relation
to the provision of bank credit, the Supreme Court upheld the Seoul High
Court’s finding that there were clear divides between KTPI and the defendant
in organization, assets, accounting, and business details.94) Also, the Court was
unable to ascertain any element of illegality from the defendant’s use of KTPI
in relation to the Subject Contracts. In the final analysis, the Court upheld the
high court holding that the defendant could rightfully assert the separate legal
entity of KTPI in denying the defendant’s contractual liabilities under the
Subject Contracts vis-à-vis the plaintiff.95)
46 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 27
91) Id.
92) Id. at 1606-1607.
93) Id. at 1607.
94) Id.
95) Id. at 1607-1608.
IV. Commentary96)
1. The criterion of subjective intent/purpose 
As the objective indicia for applying veil piercing in a parent company-
subsidiary setting, 2004Da26119 required complete parental control of the
subsidiary, coupled with intermingling of assets, business and external
corporate activities between the two entities.97) The Court also mandated a
showing of the subjective motive or purpose with which the parent had
abused the legal entity of the subsidiary for pursuit of illicit objectives such as
dodging contractual obligations.
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s decision is in line with the jurisprudence
on the doctrine of aemulatio vicini or abuse of rights in that both require proof
on the element of subjective motive or purpose.98) Under this doctrine, which
is codified in Article 2(2) of Min Beop [the Civil Code],99) abuse of rights can be
sustained on a showing of, inter alia, conscious exercise by the right holder of
what is otherwise a lawful right for the sole purpose of inflicting affliction on a
neighbor even in the absence of any lawful gain to be derived from such act.
Also, 2004Da26119 appears to be in line with and influenced by the
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96) In respect of 2004Da26119, a commentator noted that since the case involved a plea for
lifting the corporate veil of an offshore (i.e. Pilipino) subsidiary of the defendant, a Korean
corporation, the Supreme Court should have ascertained the appropriate governing law by
applying conflicts of law principles in determining whether to lift the veil of such overseas
subsidiary or not, and resolved the case in light of the governing law. Yet the Court erred in
failing to consider this governing law issue at all. This observation is with merit, but beyond the
scope of this piece. See Kwang-Hyun Suk, Oegukhwesaeui beopinkyeok buin [Piercing the Corporate
Veil of an Offshore Corporation], LEGAL TIMES, Sep. 8, 2008. For further details in this regard, see
Tae-Jin Kim, Beopinkyeok buine kwanhan gukjesabeopjeok geomto [Review of Veil Piercing from a
Private International Law Perspective], Presentation before the Korean Society of Private
International Law (Aug. 29, 2008).
97) The high court required as the objective criteria such factors as the absence of separate
accounting machination between a mother company and her subsidiary, disregard of corporate
protocols, undercapitalization of the subsidiary, and misuse of the subsidiary’s legal entity. 
98) For instance, in Judgment of Feb. 14, 2003, 2002Da62319&62326 (Supreme Court of
Korea), the Court required as prima facie proof of an abuse of right that the right holder exercise
its right solely for the subjective purpose of inflicting pain and suffering on another party. 
99) Article 2(2) provides: “Rights shall not be abused.”
prevailing theory among Japanese legal academics on the requirements of veil
piercing. In Japan, the majority of jurists hold the position that extending the
application of veil piercing in an indiscriminate manner will run counter to
the maintenance of legal certainty.100) As such, the element of illicit or unjust
purpose is usually required before any disregard of corporate entity may be
attempted.101)
In the meanwhile, the majority of Korean jurists take the view that
difficulties in substantiating the parental purpose or motive may dampen the
overall efficacy of veil piercing.102) In addition, there may be situations where
foisting personal liability on the sole shareholder, despite lack of any mala fide
on such person’s part, would be consistent with the mandates of justice (for
instance, when the subsidiary is all but solvent), hence rendering the criterion
of subjective purpose/intent dubious at best.
In particular, the Court in 2004Da26119 refused to read or otherwise infer
an illegal or unjust motive of the parent from a pre-determined set of facts.103)
This set of facts mostly pertained to the other party to the underlying
transaction(s). However, the logical outworking of this decision leaves open
the possibility that knowledge or (in)action of such other party may well
override or obviate the illicit purpose, if any, of the parent. By way of example,
there may be situations where the other party in a transaction proceeded with
the transaction without cautionary measures despite her awareness of the
subsidiary being undercapitalized compared to the risk intrinsic in the
transaction, while, all along, the parent did harbor an illicit motive in its
relationship with the subsidiary. In such situation, the other party would be
barred from asserting abuse of corporate entity by the parent under a theory
of the assumption of risk, not based on a piercing theory involving parental
purpose or motive. 
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100) For a similar view in Korea, see Sang-Hyun Song, Bojeungchaemugeum deung (Seoul
Godeungbeopwon 74Na2582 pangyulpyeongseok) [Guarantee Liability, etc, Case Commentary on
Judgment of Seoul High Court, 74 Na 2582], LEGAL TIMES, 8, May 27, 1974. 
101) See Chang-Woo Nam, Hwesa beopinkyeok musieui beopli [Legal Theory of Corporate Veil
Piercing] (1995), (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Korea University) (on file with Korea
University).
102) See Id.; see also CHUL-SONG LEE, HWESABEOP GANGEUI (LECTURES ON CORPORATE LAW) 51-
52, (Bak-young-sa 16th ed. 2009). 
103) See supra III. 2. 2).
Needless to say, lifting the corporate veil should be understood and
carved out as an exception to limited liability. However, this normative issue
might be more efficiently dealt with by tightening the prerequisites for the
“objective indicia” without necessarily importing the murky element of
parental motive or intent into the overall conceptual schema. 
Even assuming, arguendo,104) the need for parental motive or intent is a
valid one, courts will still need to rely on certain fact patterns of recurrence or
with general applicability for sorting out such motive or intent. In this regard,
it may be a prudent move for the Court to delineate what such factual
elements are in an effort to ease the inordinate evidentiary burden on plaintiff
in proving the purpose/motive at issue. It is anticipated that the criteria set
forth in 2006Da24438105) will serve as a useful guidepost in ongoing judicial
efforts in this respect. 
2. The criteria for disregarding the corporate entity in a parent-subsidiary
corporate group
Corporate law, which provides for the separate personality of a legal
person, has been traditionally premised on autonomous corporate
management accompanied by individual assumption of liability arising there
from. Yet with the advance of capitalism, a sizable number of corporations
have set up subsidiaries that operate under their tutelage. These corporate
groups often act as a single economic unit and evade liability by tinkering
with the legal fiction of corporate entity. As a product of this trend, the
likelihood for minority stockholders or creditors of the subsidiary to suffer
detriment is ever increasing. This state of affairs, in turn, heightens the need
for proactive recourse to veil piercing for these stakeholders’ protection.
Apart from the foregoing, albeit varying in degree, a subsidiary is in
general under control of the parent with substantial ties in respect of, among
others, labor and finance. As such, readily lifting the corporate veil on such
nexus alone may well enervate the very backbone of corporate law as
encapsulated in limited liability. In case of Korean conglomerates, it is the
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105) See supra note 69.
norm that the parent exerts dominant control over the subsidiary only in
relation to significant matters with day-to-day business largely entrusted to
the subsidiary. In this type of business milieu, just because the parent exerts
certain degrees of domination should not mean that the corporate veil of the
subsidiary is to be readily pierced through.  While a circle of legal scholars and
commentators espouses the view that when the doctrine of corporate veil
piercing is applied to Konzern or a corporate group, it should be within the
overall framework of dominance and control without regard to abuse or
formalization of the corporate entity,106) such view leaves open a loophole that
disregarding corporate entity on control alone may lead to abuse of veil
piercing since there is invariably a chain of control in any given Konzern.  
2004Da26119 took it for granted the presence of ties between the parent
and the subsidiary in human resources and finance. As such, the Supreme
Court found it insufficient to find an abuse of corporate personality vis-à-vis
creditors of the subsidiary, from the pertinent facts of the case evincing some
semblance of parental control. This judicial pronouncement is welcome in that
it limits the likelihood of lifting the corporate veil for the reason of parental
control alone and consequently hampering overall legal certainty. 
In the meanwhile, the existence of complete parental control, which the
Court required as a quid pro quo to veil piercing, may be ascertained in each
case by such objective indicia as comingling of assets, business, and/or
external corporate activities,107) and this objective requirement appears
reasonable. It is hoped that specifically when these indicia can be found
present will flesh out through evolution of jurisprudence in the future.   
V. Conclusion
2004Da26119 was a landmark setting out the criteria for veil piercing in a
parent company-subsidiary setting. The Court’s holding in this case was
balanced in that the facts of the case did not warrant lifting the corporate veil
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106) Dae-Youn Kim, Jibaejongsokhwesae daehan yeongu (2) — Gyeolhapeseoeui beopinkyeok
buinron [Second Study on the Parent-Subsidiary Corporation — Veil Piercing in the Context of Merged
Corporations], 44-1 Busan U. L. R. 347, 367(2003).
107) See supra note 87.
as evidenced by distinct divides between the defendant and its subsidiary
KTPI in respect of organization, assets, accounting, and business practices. On
the other hand, the aspect of the decision mandating the subjective motive of
the parent as a pre-condition for veil piercing is a cause for concern in that
such proposition would in effect bring the doctrine of veil piercing to a
standstill on account of the evidentiary difficulties it will invariably pose in
practice. 
Since the Court’s decision in 2004Da26119, the number of judicial decisions
in Korea probing the prerequisites for veil piercing has been on an incremental
increase.108) Even though it may be ardent to systemize such criteria due to
their general nature and applicability, the remedy of veil piercing will remain
at the active disposal of claimants provided that the judiciary continues to
hand down more trailblazing cases supplemented by enriching input from the
legal academia. 
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108) See, e.g., Judgment of Jul. 13, 2006, 2004Da36130 (Supreme Court) and Judgment of
Aug. 21, 2008, 2006Da24438 (Supreme Court). 
